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Abstract: We examine the stability of international environmental agreements when they include both
adaptation and mitigation policies. We assume that adaptation requires a prior irreversible investment and
presents the characteristics of a private good by reducing a country’s vulnerability to the impact of pollution,
while mitigation policies produce a public good by reducing the total amount of pollution.
Using a stylized model, we show that adaptive measures can be used strategically and that their inclusion
in environmental agreements enhances agreement stability and can even lead to full cooperation. However,
adaptation does not help cooperation in mitigation policies. Finally, we evaluate how including adaptive
measures for climate change in international environmental agreements affects welfare and overall pollution.
Keywords: Adaptation, climate change, mitigation, strategy, stability
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1 Introduction
It is increasingly recognized that there are two different ways of responding to climate change and its impacts:
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and investing in adaptive measures. At the international level,
this has been acknowledged at several United Nations conferences on climate change (Cancun 2010, Durban
2011, Doha 2012, Paris 2015) and in the series of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
assessments reports published over time (Third Assessment Report 2001, Fourth Assessment Report 2007,
Fifth Assessment Report 2014). However, in the discussions on climate change, the ambiguous effects of
adaptation are often raised.
Following on the statement in the Third Assessment Report, “Adaptation is a necessary strategy at all
scales to complement climate change mitigation efforts,”1 our aim in this paper is to study the consequences
of including resolutions on adaptive measures in the negotiation of an International Environmental Agree-
ment (IEA) aiming at reducing GHG emissions. In particular, we investigate the case where commitments
to adaptive solutions are made before those related to mitigation efforts. The problem is modelled as a
three-stage game. In the first stage, countries decide whether or not to be party to the agreement; in the
second stage, countries choose their investment in adaptive measures according to their membership status;
and in the third stage, countries play a mitigation game, where decisions are dependent on membership and
on the adaptation choices made in the previous stages. The analysis is carried out for two cases representing
two different types of agreement. The first is called a full agreement and requires signatory countries to
coordinate both their adaptation and mitigation policies. The second type is called a partial agreement ; in
this case, signatory countries agree to coordinate only their adaptation policies (while each country decides
on its mitigation policy individually). The games are solved by backward recursion. Our study extends and
completes part of the work developed in Breton and Sbragia (2016), who examine how different types of
adaptive measures impact on environmental costs and levels of effort, for any number of parties to the agree-
ment, when signatory countries act either as leaders or not in responding to climate change. However, the
paper does not address the issue of membership stability in such agreements; this is thus the main objective
of the present paper.
Other works have looked at the effects of adaptive investments on membership in IEAs, for example,
Marrouch and Chaudhuri (2011), Masoudi and Zaccour (2016), Lazkano, Marrouch and Nkuiya (2016), and
Masoudi and Zaccour (2017). Under the assumption of a bilinear damage cost, where signatory countries
act as leaders, and emissions and adaptation efforts are decided simultaneously by the players, Marrouch
and Chaudhuri (2011) show that large stable coalitions can be reached and the level of total emissions can
be below the non-cooperative level. Under the assumption of a quadratic damage cost, the main feature
of Masoudi and Zaccour (2016) and Masoudi and Zaccour (2017) is that adaptation has a “public good
flavour,” in that the benefits of adaptive measures are shared by the signatory countries and can spill over to
all players. In a setting where countries decide on their environmental policies simultaneously, Masoudi and
Zaccour (2016) find that the adaptation effort of signatory countries is higher than that of non-signatories,
and that for some parameter values, stable IEAs can form with a significant number of players.
In Lazkano, Marrouch and Nkuiya (2016), the stability of an IEA is studied for countries that are asym-
metric in adaptation cost parameters and that choose their emission and adaptation levels simultaneously.
The authors show that when the environmental damage cost is linear, asymmetry in adaptation cost param-
eters does not change the standard result on the size of a stable IEA, which is three signatories. However,
when damage cost is quadratic, cross-country differences in adaptation may encourage participation in an
IEA. The asymmetrical feature of the model by Lazkano, Marrouch and Nkuiya (2016) links their paper
to another stream of the literature on IEAs that looks at the impact of some sort of asymmetry among
countries on the size of a stable agreement. Examples of such investigations are Fuentes-Albero and Rubio
(2010), Glanemann (2012), and Pavlova and de Zeeuw (2013). These analyses all find that, in stylized models
without transfers, asymmetry in a single aspect is not sufficient to change the usual small-size-coalition result
(coalition size of no greater than three); to achieve large coalitions, countries have to be different in more
than one respect, and the asymmetries among countries have to be strong.
1https://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg2/index.php?idp=10
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This asymmetric aspect also comes into play in our model, but in a different way. In our model, countries
are identical at the start of the game, when their first decision is about their membership in the IEA. Being
a member means that expenditures on environmental policies (that is, adaptation and emissions reduction)
differ from those of non-signatory countries. Since these decisions are made in two stages, with countries first
investing in adaptive measures, and then complying with their own emissions reduction targets, countries
differ in their level of adaptation in the last stage of the game wherein emissions are decided. Thus, in
our setting, the asymmetry of countries arises from adaptation decisions that are endogenous to the game
itself. Nonetheless, our paper with endogenous asymmetry confirms the result of the exogenous-asymmetry
literature: the pessimistic small-coalition result persists in the mitigation game when countries differ in their
adaptation levels.
An important difference in our model, as compared to the above-mentioned literature on the stability of
IEAs, is that we assume that countries commit to adaptive investments prior to making mitigation decisions
instead of simultaneously. This is an important aspect, as adaptive measures can then play a strategic role,
as shown in Breton and Sbragia (2016). A similar approach is taken in Masoudi and Zaccour (2017), where
the focus is on the stability of an IEA involving only adaptation. There, the authors show that a large IEA
on adaptation is achievable, including full participation. Their model is similar to our partial-agreement
case, the main difference lying in the private-good nature of adaptation. In Masoudi and Zaccour (2017),
benefits from investing in adaptation may not be fully appropriable and are voluntarily shared among the
signatories, whereas in our model, adaptation is an investment that has the properties of a private good. Our
private-adaptation version of a partial agreement exclusively involving adaptive measures confirms the results
found in Masoudi and Zaccour (2017). This implies that knowledge spillovers are not necessary for a large
coalition on adaptation. The result extends to the full-agreement case, where we also find that incorporating
adaptation when negotiating an IEA improves the stability of the agreement.
An important issue raised by the prior-commitment assumption in an agreement including both adaptive
and mitigation measures is its dynamic stability. In the full-agreement case, players could revise their
membership decision and leave the agreement after implementing agreed upon adaptation measures. In this
case, we show that it is not possible to maintain cooperation in mitigation policies and that any agreement
including both types of actions will break down after the initial investment in adaptation measures.
Another important contribution of our paper is its examination of the economic and environmental impli-
cations of including adaptive measures in environmental agreements. This is done by comparing the outcomes
achieved by all countries when a stable coalition of players forms, with the outcomes when countries indi-
vidually decide on their levels of adaptation and mitigation for both the full- and partial-agreement cases.
This is justified by the fact that, regardless of any agreements, countries are increasingly investing in adap-
tive measures to counteract the impacts of climate change. The interesting result is that when adaptation
is regulated by agreement and a stable coalition size is reached, the total adaptation expenditures, emis-
sions and environmental costs are lower than when there is no agreement and countries adapt in their own
individual way.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly recalls the prior-commitment model of
Breton and Sbragia (2016). Section 3 characterizes equilibrium environmental policies in the presence of
an IEA involving a subset of countries. Section 4 investigates the dynamic stability of IEAs when players
can revise their membership decisions after their investment in adaptive measures. Section 5 reports on the
welfare impact of including adaptive measures in IEAs. Section 6 supplies a conclusion.
2 Model
The model is the same as in Breton and Sbragia (2016). We consider n symmetric countries whose production
activities create economic value but also pollution emissions as a by-product.
Countries have two mechanisms at their disposal that can be used to respond to the adverse consequences
of pollution emissions. The first, called adaptation, involves investing in private measures to counterbalance
the negative effects of climate change (for instance, developing a crop variety that resists droughts). The
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effect of adaptation is a reduction in the country’s vulnerability to pollution, described as
vj = E − bj
where E is the total emissions by countries, and bj ∈ [0, E] measures the reduction in vulnerability resulting
from adaptive measures. The cost of adaptation for country j is an increasing convex function of bj , assumed
quadratic, that is,
Aj(bj) = γA
2
b2j
where γA > 0 is the adaptation cost coefficient.
The second environmental policy is called mitigation and it consists of any means (e.g., filters) aimed at
curtailing the pollution emissions of country j, denoted by ej ; we normalize the production technology in
such a way that the optimal emissions of country j when there is no environmental concern is equal to 1, so
that mitigation is represented by the variable
mj = 1− ej ,
where mj ∈ [0, 1] is the reduction in the country’s emissions with respect to the base level of 1. The total
pollution from all countries is then given by
E =
n∑
j=1
(1−mj) .
The cost of mitigation for country j is an increasing convex function of mj , assumed quadratic, that is,
Mj(mj) = γM
2
m2j
where γM > 0 is the mitigation cost coefficient.
Global pollution reduces each country’s welfare (e.g., causes losses in productivity) and this environmental
cost is increasing and convex in the country’s environmental vulnerability, that is,
Dj(vj) = γE
2
v2j
where γE > 0 is the environmental sensitivity coefficient.
The overall environmental cost for a representative country j is thus given by
zj =
γE
2
(E − bj)2 + γM
2
m2j +
γA
2
b2j .
As in Breton and Sbragia (2016), we normalize the cost by setting γM = 1 and we use aj ≡ γEbj , yielding
an equivalent cost function involving two parameters
cj =
ω
2
E2 − Eaj + 1
2
m2j +
θ
2
a2j
where E ≡∑ni=1 (1−mi), ω ≡ γEγM > 0 is the environmental sensitivity parameter and θ ≡ γM γA+γEγ2E > 0 is
a parameter accounting for the impact of adaptive measures on both the adaptation and environmental costs.
The objective of country j is to choose the mitigation and adaptation levels that minimize the environmental
cost cj . Note that θω =
γA+γE
γE
> 1, which ensures that the cost function of an individual country, given the
environmental strategies of the other countries, is strictly convex. Notice also that the restriction 0 ≤ bj ≤ E
is always satisfied in equilibrium.
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3 The game
In this section we study the effects of including adaptive investments in the negotiation of an IEA aiming
to reduce pollution emissions, when commitments to climate-change-adaptive measures are made before
emissions-mitigation decisions. This is modelled as a three-stage game.
In the first stage, countries play a “membership” game. Countries that subscribe to the agreement are
called signatory countries and their decisions are made in the interest of all members, that is, they minimize
their aggregate total environmental cost. Countries that do not subscribe to the agreement are called non-
signatory countries and their decisions are driven by their individual interest. We denote by C the set of
(cooperating) signatory countries and by I the set of (individualistic) non-signatory countries, where |C| = N ,
|I| = M and N +M = n.
In the second stage, countries play an “adaptation” game, that is, they decide how much they will invest
in measures to counteract the adverse effects of climate change.
In the third stage, countries play a “mitigation” game, that is, they decide how much effort they will
dedicate to curtailing their emissions.
We will distinguish between two contrasting cases concerning the scope of the environmental agreement.
In the first case (full agreement), signatory countries agree to coordinate both their adaptation and mitigation
policies; in the second case (partial agreement), signatory countries only agree to coordinate their adaptation
policies. The game is solved by backward recursion.
3.1 Equilibrium solution of the mitigation game
To solve the mitigation game, we make no assumption on the adaptation levels decided on in the preceding
stage of the game. Accordingly, each country j is characterized by a parameter aj representing its prior
investment in adaptive measures. We denote by mCj the mitigation effort of a signatory country j, and
by mIj the mitigation effort of a non-signatory country j.
3.1.1 Full agreement
In this case, the agreement regulates both environmental policies. A non-cooperating country j ∈ I solves
min
mj∈[0,1]
{
ω
2
(Oj −mj)2 − (Oj −mj) aj + 1
2
m2j +
θ
2
a2j
}
(1)
where Oj = n−
∑
i6=jmi. Assuming an interior solution, the first-order conditions for all j ∈ I yield
mIj = ωE − aj for all j ∈ I.
The non-cooperating countries’ mitigation policy is a value proportional to the total emissions reduced by
their individual level of adaptation.
Cooperating countries j ∈ C jointly solve
min
mj∈[0,1], j∈C
∑
j∈C
ω
2
(
OC −
∑
i∈C
mi
)2
−
(
OC −
∑
i∈C
mi
)
aj +
1
2
m2j +
θ
2
a2j

where OC = n−
∑
i/∈C mi. Assuming an interior solution, the first-order conditions yield
mCj = N (ωE − aC) for all j ∈ C,
where aC =
∑
i∈C ai
N is the average adaptation level of the cooperating countries. We observe that the
mitigation efforts of all cooperating countries are the same, irrespective of their adaptation levels; moreover,
the cooperating countries’ mitigation effort would be N times higher than that of non-cooperating countries
with an adaptation level equal to aC .
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The equilibrium solution of the mitigation game is readily obtained by solving for the total emissions:
E = n−
∑
j∈C
N (ωE − aC)−
∑
j∈I
(ωE − aj)
yielding
E =
n+MaI +N
2aC
ωN2 +Mω + 1
(2)
mIj = ωE − aj , j ∈ I (3)
mCj = mC = N (ωE − aC) , j ∈ C (4)
where aI =
∑
i∈I ai
M is the average adaptation level of the non-cooperating countries.
3.1.2 Partial agreement
In the case where the agreement does not include the coordination of mitigation policies, all players solve the
optimization problem (1), so that
mj = ωE − aj for j = 1, ..., n.
The equilibrium solution of the mitigation game is then obtained by solving for the total emissions:
E = n−
∑
j∈C
(ωE − aj)−
∑
j∈I
(ωE − aj)
yielding
E =
n+MaI +NaC
nω + 1
(5)
mIj = ωE − aj , j ∈ I (6)
mCj = ωE − aj , j ∈ C. (7)
3.2 Equilibrium solution of the adaptation game
In the adaptation game, players take into account the equilibrium solution (2)–(4) or (5)–(7) to determine
their investment in adaptation. We denote by aCj the level of adaptation collectively chosen for a signatory
country j, and by aIj the individual level of adaptation selected by a non-signatory country j.
3.2.1 Full agreement
In the case of a full agreement, the solution of the adaptation game is the same as in Breton and Sbragia
(2016) and is obtained by solving, for non-cooperating countries,
min
aj
{
ω
2
(
n+A−j + aj +N2aC
ωN2 +Mω + 1
)2
−
(
n+A−j + aj +N2aC
ωN2 +Mω + 1
)
aj
+
1
2
(
ω
(
n+A−j + aj +N2aC
ωN2 +Mω + 1
)
− aj
)2
+
θ
2
a2j
}
where A−j =
∑
i∈I,i6=j ai, and, for cooperating countries,
min
aj
{
ω
2
(
n+MaI +N
2aj
ωN2 +Mω + 1
)2
−
(
n+MaI +N
2aj
ωN2 +Mω + 1
)
aj
+
1
2
(
N
(
ω
(
n+MaI +N
2aj
ωN2 +Mω + 1
)
− aj
))2
+
θ
2
a2j
}
,
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yielding the equilibrium solution
aIj = aI =
nW1 (ω + 1) (W1 − ω)
(
θW1 +MN
2ω
)
K1 +MN2 (N2ω + 1) (ω + 1) (Mω + 1) (ω −W1) , j ∈ I (8)
aCj = aC =
nW1
(
N2ω + 1
)
(Mω + 1)
(
θW1 + ω
(
M +N2 − 1))
K1 +MN2 (N2ω + 1) (ω + 1) (Mω + 1) (ω −W1) , j ∈ C (9)
where
W1 ≡ ω
(
M +N2
)
+ 1
K1 =
(
θW 21 +N
2
(
ω
(
M2ω −N2)− 1)) (θW 21 −M2ω + (N2ω + 1) (W1 −M − ω − 1))
and aC > aI .
3.2.2 Partial agreement
In the case of a partial agreement, a non-cooperating country solves
min
aj
{
ω
2
(
n+A−j +NaC + aj
ωn+ 1
)2
−
(
n+A−j +NaC + aj
ωn+ 1
)
aj
+
1
2
(
ω
n+A−j +NaC + aj
ωn+ 1
− aj
)2
+
θ
2
a2j
}
.
Since countries are symmetrical, the equilibrium reaction of non-cooperating countries to aC is then
aIj =
(ω + 1) (−ω + ωn+ 1) (n+NaC)
θ (nω + 1)
2 −M (nω + 1) + ω (n− 1) (Nω + 1) , j ∈ I.
Symmetrical cooperating countries jointly solve
min
aj
{
ω
2
(
n+MaI +Naj
ωn+ 1
)2
−
(
n+MaI +Naj
ωn+ 1
)
aj +
1
2
(
ω
n+MaI +NaC
ωn+ 1
− aj
)2
+
θ
2
a2j
}
.
Their reaction to aI is
aCj =
(ω + 1) (Mω + 1) (n+MaI)
θ (nω + 1)
2
+ (Mω + 1)
2 −N (2Mω +Nω + 2) , j ∈ C.
The equilibrium solution of the adaptation game is then
aIj = aI = nW2 (ω + 1)
(W2 − ω) (θW2 −N +Mω + 1)
K2K3 −MN (ω + 1)2 (Mω + 1) (W2 − ω)
, j ∈ I (10)
aCj = aC = nW2 (ω + 1)
(Mω + 1) (θW2 + ω (n− 1))
K2K3 −MN (ω + 1)2 (Mω + 1) (W2 − ω)
, j ∈ C (11)
where
W2 ≡ nω + 1
K2 = θW
2
2 + (Mω + 1)
2 −N (W2 +Mω + 1)
K3 = θW
2
2 −MW2 + ω (n− 1) (Nω + 1) .
Notice that, in partial agreements, the adaptation level of signatory countries is lower than that of non-
signatories:
aC − aI = − n (ω + 1)W
2
2 (θω − 1) (N − 1)
K2K3 −MN (ω + 1)2 (Mω + 1) (W2 − ω)
< 0.
This is the reverse of what is obtained in full agreements.
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3.3 Membership game
To solve the membership game, we adopt the non-cooperative point of view, which assumes that agreements
must be self-enforcing. Accordingly, following d’Aspremont et al. (1983), an equilibrium is defined by two
conditions: the internal stability, which implies that signatories have no incentive to leave the agreement,
and the external stability, which implies that non-signatories have no incentive to join the agreement.
Let CC (N) and CI (N) represent the equilibrium costs for a signatory and a non-signatory player,
respectively, when the number of signatory countries is N :
CC (N) =
ω
2
E2 − EaC + 1
2
(mC)
2
+
θ
2
(aC)
2
CI (N) =
ω
2
E2 − EaI + 1
2
(mI)
2
+
θ
2
(aI)
2
where E, aC , aI , mC and mI are given, as a function of N, by (2)–(4) and (8)–(9) for a full agreement, or
by (5)–(7) and (10)–(11) for a partial agreement. The internal and external stability conditions defining the
equilibrium of the membership game are then, respectively,
CC (N)− CI (N − 1) ≤ 0
CC (N + 1)− CI (N) ≥ 0.
3.3.1 No adaptation
First notice that the equilibrium solution obtained using (2)–(4) with aC = aI = 0 corresponds to an
agreement among symmetrical countries, involving mitigation policies only. In this case,
CC (N) =
1
2
n2ω
N2ω + 1
(Mω +N2ω + 1)
2
CI (N − 1) = 1
2
n2ω
ω + 1(
(M + 1)ω + (N − 1)2 ω + 1
)2
and the internal stability condition is
CC (N)− CI (N − 1) = K4n
2ω2 (N − 1)
2
(
(M + 1)ω + (N − 1)2 ω + 1
)2
(Mω +N2ω + 1)
2
≤ 0
where
K4 = ω
2 (M +N (N − 2)) (M + 2N +MN +N2 (N − 1))
+2ω
(
M (N − 1) + 2 (N − 1) +N2 (N − 3))
+ (N − 3) .
It is easy to verify that K4 > 0 for any N ≥ 3, which means that the maximum size of an equilibrium
coalition in the membership game is two. This is a well known result for agreements on mitigation policies
involving symmetrical players.
3.3.2 Adaptation with a prior commitment
On the other hand, when adaptation is included in the agreement, stable equilibrium solutions with a sig-
nificant number of signatories may be obtained for both a full and a partial agreement. As an illustration,
Table 1 reports the solutions of the membership game for both the full- and partial-agreement cases, and for
a variety of parameter values when n = 50. The table shows examples where full cooperation is reached in
both types of agreements. It also contains instances where a coalition is formed under a partial agreement
but not under a full agreement. Moreover, in all numerical experiments, the size of the stable coalition in
the full-agreement case is smaller than or equal to that in the partial-agreement case.
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Table 1: This table reports the size of stable coaltions in the membership game for various parameter values when the total
number of countries is n = 50 and γM = 1. Values are reported for both the full- and partial-agreement cases.
γA ω = γE θ =
γA+γE
γ2
E
Partial Full
0.001 0.01 110 4 2
0.001 0.1 10.1 18 2
0.001 1 1.001 50 48
0.002 0.2 5.05 27 0
0.002 0.3 3.356 34 28
0.01 0.3 3.444 28 0
0.01 0.4 2.563 32 22
0.01 0.8 1.266 42 38
0.01 1 1.01 44 41
0.01 1.2 0.84 45 43
0.01 1.5 0.671 47 45
0.01 2 0.503 48 47
0.01 3 0.334 50 50
1 0.001 106 3 2
1 50 0.0204 50 50
2 0.001 2× 106 2 2
3.3.3 Adaptation with simultaneous decisions
It is interesting to compare the above results with the case where adaptation and mitigation decisions are
taken simultaneously. The solution of the adaptation game is the same as in Breton and Sbragia (2016) and
is obtained by solving
min
aj
{
ω
2
E2 − Eaj + 1
2
m2j +
θ
2
a2j
}
,
yielding
aj =
E
θ
for j = 1, ..., n.
It it then straightforward to retrieve the full- and partial-agreement equilibrium solutions using (2)–(4)
or (5)–(7), respectively.
The full-agreement solution2 is then
aj =
E
θ
mIj = ωE − aj = Eφ
mCj = N (ωE − aC) = NEφ
E = n−N (NEφ)−M (Eφ)
=
n
φ (M +N2) + 1
where φ ≡ θω−1θ . The total cost for signatory and non-signatory countries, respectively, is then
CC (N) =
ω
2
E2 − EE
θ
+
1
2
(NEφ)
2
+
θ
2
(
E
θ
)2
=
1
2
n2φ
N2φ+ 1
(φ (M +N2) + 1)
2
CI (N) =
ω
2
E2 − EE
θ
+
1
2
(Eφ)
2
+
θ
2
(
E
θ
)2
=
1
2
n2φ
φ+ 1
(φ (M +N2) + 1)
2
2There is no point in examining the partial-agreement equilibrium when decisions are taken simultaneously. It is straight-
forward to observe that both signatories and non-signatories of such an agreement would make the exact same decisions.
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and the internal stability condition is
CC (N)− CI (N − 1) = K5n
2φ2 (N − 1)
2
(
φ
(
M + 1 + (N − 1)2
)
+ 1
)2
(φ (M +N2) + 1)
2
≤ 0
where
K5 = φ
2 (M +N (N − 2)) (M + 2N +MN +N2 (N − 1))
+2φ
(
(N − 1) (M + 2) +N2 (N − 3))
+ (N − 3) ,
which is strictly positive for N ≥ 3, meaning that the maximum size of a stable agreement is two. This is an
important result, as it shows that when (private) adaptive measures to the adverse consequences of climate
change are negotiated simultaneously with emissions reduction as part of an IEA, they do not change the
well-known pessimistic result that stable large-size coalitions cannot form.
4 Dynamic stability
Given our assumption that adaptation decisions require a prior commitment and an irreversible investment,
it is important to highlight that, in the case of a full agreement, countries could revise their membership
decision between the adaptation and mitigation game. In other words, a country that in the first stage has
signed the agreement and that has made an investment aC in adaptation could defect from the agreement
and decide on its mitigation level individually. The reverse could also happen: a non-signatory country
having made an investment aI could join the agreement and decide on its mitigation level cooperatively. In
this section, we investigate whether it is possible to design a renegotiation-proof agreement involving both
mitigation and adaptation policies.
To this end, we consider the general problem of the stability of an agreement between N players to
cooperate on mitigation policies when players differ in their adaptation levels.
The equilibrium solution of the mitigation game involving N cooperating players when players have
different adaptation levels is, according to (2)–(4),
E1 =
n+MaI +N
2aC
ωN2 +Mω + 1
mIj1 = ωE1 − aj , j ∈ I
mCj1 = N (ωE1 − aC) , j ∈ C.
The equilibrium solution of the mitigation game with N − 1 cooperating players, where player i defects from
the agreement, corresponds to
E2 =
n+MaI + ai + (N − 1) (NaC − ai)
ω (N − 1)2 + (M + 1)ω + 1
mi = ωE2 − ai
mIj2 = ωE2 − aj , j ∈ I
mCj2 = N
(
ωE2 − NaC − ai
N − 1
)
, j ∈ C\i.
As players involved in the membership game are not symmetrical, the internal stability condition becomes
CCi (N)− CIi (N − 1) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ C, where
CCi (N) =
ω
2
E21 − E1ai +
1
2
(N (ωE1 − aC))2 + θ
2
(ai)
2
CIi (N) =
ω
2
E22 − E2ai +
1
2
(ωE2 − ai)2 + θ
2
(ai)
2
.
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Proposition 1 When adaptation to climate change is a prior investment to mitigation decisions and players
differ in their adaptation levels, no stable coalition exists in the mitigation game.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that adaptation reduces a country’s vulnerability to the negative effects of global pollution. Propo-
sition 1 indicates that asymmetry in countries’ vulnerability to global pollution does not help in achieving
coordination in mitigation policies; even the small-coalition-result of the symmetric game does not hold, as
coalitions of two players are no longer stable.
When this general result is applied to the full-agreement case analyzed in the previous section, we obtain
that even if all coalition members agree on identical levels of adaptation, since the equilibrium (8)–(9)
prescribes different adaptation levels for signatory and non-signatory countries, players should expect the
agreement to break down between the second and the third stage of the game, that is, a full agreement is
not renegotiation-proof.
This is why we also studied the stability of a partial agreement in Section 3. When players are farsighted
and expect a full agreement to break down after their investments in adaptive measures, the equilibrium
solution corresponds to a partial agreement and is given by (5)–(7) and (10)–(11). Our illustrative results
in Table 1 show that, depending on the parameter values, partial agreements can still involve a significant
proportion of countries.
5 Economic and environmental implications of adaptive measures in
IEAs
In this section, we evaluate the implications of incorporating adaptive policies into IEAs, by comparing the
outcomes of the full- and partial-agreement cases with the benchmark case where there is no agreement on
environmental policies. This benchmark can be readily obtained from either the full- or partial-agreement
case by setting N = 1, yielding
a =
n (ω + 1) (ω (n− 1) + 1)
θ (nω + 1)
2 − ω (n (n− 1) + 1)− n
E =
n (a+ 1)
nω + 1
m =
nω − a
nω + 1
.
Tables 2 and 3 compare the equilibrium solutions of the full- and partial-agreement cases with the bench-
mark non-cooperative solution for various parameter values. Results include the total adaptive investment,
total emissions and total environmental costs for all countries, expressed as a percentage of the corresponding
result in the benchmark non-cooperative game. For both types of agreements, outcomes are computed using
the size of the stable coalition in the first-stage membership game. In the case of the full agreement, emis-
sions and costs are computed by assuming that the coalition breaks down after the investment in adaptive
measures.
For both the partial and full agreements, and for any coalition size, total adaptation, emissions and
environmental cost are smaller than are achieved when there is no agreement. This is an important result
since it shows that, from both the economic and environment points of view, including resolutions on adaptive
measures to counter the negative impact of climate change in an IEA aiming to reduce GHG emissions is
better than letting countries decide on these two policies in their own individual way. Moreover, this result is
true whether the agreement includes only adaptation measures or both adaptation and mitigation measures
(with countries withdrawing from their mitigation effort commitments later on).
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Table 2: Partial-agreement case. This table reports on the adaptation level, total emissions and total costs for various parameter
values when the total number of countries is n = 50 and when γM = 1. Adaptation, emissions and costs are computed at the
solution of the membership game and are expressed as a percentage of the benchmark non-cooperative results.
γA ω = γE Number of signatories Adaptation Emissions Costs
0.001 0.01 4 99.98 99.99 99.99
0.001 0.1 18 99.24 99.37 98.81
0.001 1 50 62.64 63.40 51.96
0.002 0.2 27 95.91 96.31 93.13
0.002 0.3 34 91.80 92.35 86.19
0.01 0.3 28 85.19 86.47 75.94
0.01 0.4 32 79.05 80.40 66.29
0.01 0.8 42 55.43 55.95 34.80
0.01 1 44 47.36 48.65 27.50
0.01 1.2 45 43.65 44.78 23.87
0.01 1.5 47 33.15 34.21 16.19
0.01 2 48 27.46 28.30 12.43
0.01 3 50 19.4 20.55 8.69
1 0.001 3 99.99 100.00 100.00
1 50 50 4.15 4.23 0.34
2 0.001 2 99.99 100.00 100.00
Table 3: Full-agreement case when the agreement breaks down after the adaptation game. This table reports on the adaptation
level, total emissions and total costs for various parameter values when the total number of countries is n = 50 and when γM = 1.
Values are reported for the full-agreement case when the agreement breaks down after the adaptation game. Adaptation,
emissions and costs are computed at the solution of the membership game and are expressed as a percentage of the benchmark
non-cooperative results.
γA ω = γE Number of signatories Adaptation Emissions Costs
0.001 0.01 2 99.83 99.95 99.90
0.001 0.1 2 99.89 99.91 99.83
0.001 1 48 57.97 58.81 48.89
0.002 0.2 0 100.00 100.00 100.00
0.002 0.3 28 86.76 87.65 78.47
0.01 0.3 0 100.00 100.00 100.00
0.01 0.4 22 84.64 85.63 74.15
0.01 0.8 38 52.79 54.26 32.64
0.01 1 41 46.03 47.35 25.98
0.01 1.2 43 41.08 42.27 21.62
0.01 1.5 45 35.39 36.42 17.20
0.01 2 47 28.09 28.93 12.54
0.01 3 50 16.10 16.73 7.51
1 0.001 2 99.81 100.00 100.00
1 50 50 4.16 4.23 0.33
2 0.001 2 99.81 100.00 100.00
6 Conclusion
The objective of the paper was to study the consequences of introducing resolutions on adaptive measures
into an IEA. We focused on the case of private adaptive solutions that need a prior commitment with respect
to emissions-reduction decisions.
The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows:
• When an IEA includes private adaptive investments settled prior to mitigation decisions, stable coali-
tions with a significant number of signatory countries can be obtained, no matter how mitigation
decisions are made (full agreement vs. partial agreement or nonrenegotiation-proof full agreement).
– The size of a stable coalition for an agreement involving only adaptation measures is at least as
large as that of an agreement involving both adaptation and mitigation efforts.
– Full cooperation can be achieved for some parameter values.
– Unfortunately, these adaptive investments do not change the standard result for the mitiga-
tion game.
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• Pessimistic results are also obtained when decisions on adaptive investments and emissions reductions
are made simultaneously: the maximum size of a stable agreement is then still two.
• Finally, an IEA with private adaptive investments is able to generate less adaptive effort, less global
pollution and a smaller environmental cost, as compared to a situation where there is no agreement on
adaptation and mitigation.
Compared to the related literature, we showed that an endogenous asymmetry of the players provides
results that are in line with the literature on IEA and asymmetric players, and that to have some positive
effects on the stability of an IEA, we do not need spillovers of adaptation benefits.
The major conclusions that we can draw from our results are that private adaptive investments to coun-
teract the adverse consequences of climate change should be incorporated into IEAs, as this would enhance
their stability and improve the overall welfare of all countries, provided that the adaptive measures considered
in such agreements require commitments and investments prior to mitigation decisions.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Let
Si =
1
2
ω
(
E21 − E22
)− ai (E1 − E2) + 1
2
(N (ωE1 − aC))2 + 1
2
(ωE2 − ai)2 .
The internal stability condition for a given coalition of size N is then Si ≤ 0 for all i ∈ C. Define T ≡
n+MaI +N
2aC and D ≡ aC − ai. We then have
E1 =
T
ωN2 +Mω + 1
E2 =
T − ai (N − 2)−N (ai +D)
ωN2 +Mω + 1− 2ω (N − 1)
Si =
1
2
ω
((
T
ωN2 +Mω + 1
)2
−
(
T − ai (N − 2)−N (ai +D)
ωN2 +Mω + 1− 2ω (N − 1)
)2)
−ai
(
T
ωN2 +Mω + 1
− T − ai (N − 2)−N (ai +D)
ωN2 +Mω + 1− 2ω (N − 1)
)
+
1
2
(
N
(
ω
(
T
ωN2 +Mω + 1
)
− (ai +D)
))2
+
1
2
(
ω
T − ai (N − 2)−N (ai +D)
ωN2 +Mω + 1− 2ω (N − 1) − ai
)2
where ωT ≥ (ωN2 +Mω + 1) aj for all j if the solution is interior.
First assume that all players in C have the same adaptation levels, so that D = 0 for all i ∈ C. In that
case, Si reduces to
Si =
1
2
ω
((
T
ωN2 +Mω + 1
)2
−
(
T − 2ai (N − 1)
ωN2 +Mω + 1− 2ω (N − 1)
)2)
−ai
(
T
ωN2 +Mω + 1
− T − 2ai (N − 1)
ωN2 +Mω + 1− 2ω (N − 1)
)
+
1
2
N2
(
Tω − ai
(
Mω +N2ω + 1
)
Mω +N2ω + 1
)2
+
1
2
(
Tω − ai
(
Mω +N2ω + 1
)
2ω +Mω − 2Nω +N2ω + 1
)2
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= K6
(
Tω − ai
(
Mω +N2ω + 1
))2
2 (2ω +Mω − 2Nω +N2ω + 1)2 (Mω +N2ω + 1)2
where
K6 = ω
2
(
M
(
M
(
N2 + 1
)
+ 2N2 (N (N − 2) + 3))+N2 ((N − 2) (5N +N2 (N − 2) + 2)+ 8))
+2ω
(
M (N (N − 2) + 3) + (N − 2) (3N +N2 (N − 2) + 2)+ 6)+ (N − 2)2 + 1.
It is straightforward to check that K6 > 0 for N ≥ 2.We conclude that if all members of C have the same
adaptation level, there is no stable coalition.
Now assume that players in C have different adaptation levels. This means that there exists at least one
player with an adaptation level higher than the average level of the coalition, say Player i, with ai > aC .
For given values of the other parameters, Si is a quadratic function of D,
Si = k1 + k2D + k3D
2,
where
k1 =
K6
(
Tω − ai
(
Mω +N2ω + 1
))2
2 (Mω +N2ω + 1)
2
(2ω +Mω − 2Nω +N2ω + 1)2
k2 = −NK7
Tω − ai
(
Mω +N2ω + 1
)
(Mω +N2ω + 1) (2ω +Mω +Nω (N − 2) + 1)2
k3 =
N2K8
2 (2ω +Mω +Nω (N − 2) + 1)2
K7 = ω
2 (M (MN + 2N (N (N − 2) + 2) + 1) +N ((N − 1) (N − 2) + 2) (N (N − 1) + 1))
+ω (M (2N − 1) +N ((2N − 1) (N − 2) + 2) + 1) + (N − 1)
K8 = ω
2 (M (M + 2 (N (N − 2) + 2)) +N (N − 2) (N (N − 2) + 4) + 5)
+ω (2M + 2N (N − 2) + 3) + 1
Assuming an interior solution for N ≥ 2, k3 > 0, k2 < 0 and k1 > 0, this means that Si is a strictly
convex function of D that is strictly positive and decreasing at D = 0. As a result, if ai > aC , D is negative,
and the minimum value of Si is strictly positive. We conclude that the internal stability condition cannot
be satisfied whenever N ≥ 2: any player who has adapted more than the average adaptation level of the
signatories would benefit from leaving the agreement.
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